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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDALYN ENCE, nka 
WENDALYN SMITH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ENCE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 950829-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon this court by § 78-2a-3 (2) 
(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, which gives the Utah Court of Appeals 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from district courts involving divorce, property 
division and support. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Point I Was the trial court's alimony award of $1,700 per month for 
twenty-one (21) years an abuse of discretion? 
A. Are the trial court's Findings of Fact insufficient to support its 
alimony award? 
B. Did the court err in failing to enter specific detailed Findings of 
1 
Fact showing how it arrived at the amount and duration of the alimony award? 
C. Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Ence contributed 
significantly and substantially to his wife's attendance at medical school? 
Point II What factors should the trial court follow when deciding whether 
or not to make a compensation adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES 
A trial court's award of alimony is committed to the sound discretion of that 
court, and will not be disturbed absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah App. 1995). 
In setting an award of alimony, the trial court must at least consider four 
factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) recipient's 
earning capacity or ability to produce income, (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support, and (4) the length of the marriage. Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-
5(7)(a). 
The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on all factors as well as on 
all material issues unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). If the trial 
court does not meet these requirements, the Appellate court must reverse unless the 
record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow the reviewing court to apply the 
above factors as a matter of law on appeal. If the trial court considers the above 
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described factors in setting an award of alimony, the award will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
The trial court must make adequate and specific Findings of Fact justifying an 
alimony award and the award must also comply with the relevant legal principles 
governing alimony awards. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 
1993). 
A court's Findings of Fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of 
review and must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was 
reached. Breinholt 276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41. A trial court's Conclusions of Law is 
reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial court. Breinholt, 276 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88, (Utah App. 1989). 
For a successful attack on the trial court's Findings of Fact, an Appellant must 
marshal! all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate 
that, even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. Scharaf v. M.G. Corp., 700 P 2d 1068 (Utah 
1985). 
Although, Appellate courts may weigh the evidence and substitute their 
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judgment for that of the trial court in divorce actions, this is not done lightly and 
merely because its judgment may differ from that of the trial judge. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App, 1987). A finding is clearly erroneous only if 
the finding is without adequate support or induced by an erroneous view of the law. 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5-(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, and parties . . . 
Section 30-3-5-(3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, . . . . 
Section 30-3-5-(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
L) The financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse; 
ii.) The recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
iii.) The ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
iv.) The length of the marriage. 
Section 30-3-5-(7)(c), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, 
in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. 
In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during 
the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of 
the marriage. 
Section 30-3-5-(7)(e), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on a threshold of a major change 
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in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
Section 78~45-(3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his wife when 
she is in need. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment of a decree 
of divorce and related relief, and specifically, from the amount and duration of the 
alimony award. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. Plaintiff/Appellant, Wendalyn Smith, 
hereafter referred to as Dr. Smith, filed a Complaint seeking a divorce from Mr. Ence 
in Weber County District court on January 5, 1995, and Mr. Ence filed an Answer on 
February 21, 1995. After discovery and hearings, a trial was held on September 8, 
1995, before the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, presiding. On September 28, 1995, 
a further hearing was held via telephone conference whereby the court delivered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
3. Disposition at trial court. The Decree of Divorce was entered on 
November 13, 1995, awarding defendant, Mr Ence, $1,700 per month as alimony for 
a period of twenty-one (21) years. Mr. Ence's defined contribution and defined 
benefit plans were divided between the parties and a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order was ordered to be issued. The equity in the parties' home in Tucson, Arizona, 
was to be divided equally with the net proceeds after sale. 
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4. Statement of Facts. The parties married on November 25, 1974, in 
Page, Arizona. (Tr. at 17). Dr. Smith was twenty-one (21) and Mr. Ence was thirty-
five (35). (Tr. at 133). At the time of the marriage, Dr. Smith was working in a 
hospital business office as a secretary and, later in 1975, worked as a secretary for 
the Ram Valley Consolidated School District. (Tr. at 20, 21). Except for when he quit 
working in 1991, Mr. Ence worked full-time in construction at all times which he 
worked during the marriage as a heavy equipment operator and has worked in this 
field since 1956. (Tr. at 21, 134). 
The parties have jointly raised two (2) children to maturity during this marriage, 
to-wit: Tyson, born October 20, 1976, and Kelly, born November 14, 1977. (Tr. at 
18, 21, 138). After the youngest child was born in 1977, Dr. Smith worked part-time 
at home as a typist for the local airport. (Tr. at 21). In January of 1981, she started 
attending Glendale Community College in Glendale, Arizona, and transferred to Grand 
Canyon University in 1983. (Tr. at 22). Dr. Smith obtained her undergraduate degree 
in May of 1985. (Tr. at 23, 139). 
Dr. Smith worked part-time during the first semester of college. (Tr. at 22). 
During the period of approximately May 1981 through May of 1985, she attended 
college, did not work outside the home, but took full responsibility for the housework, 
child care, laundry and cooking. (Tr. at 23-25, 78-81, 139). Mr. Ence continued to 
work in construction with various jobs taking him out of town for a few days at a time. 
(Tr. at 23). 
Dr. Smith borrowed approximately $6,000 to finance her college education, 
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$1,000 from Grand Canyon University and $5,000 from Lincoln Center and also 
received scholarships. (Tr. at 25; Tr. Exhibits P1 and P2). These loans were 
subsequently repaid by Dr. Smith in December 1994 from her post residency 
earnings and after Mr. Ence had stopped working and earning. (Tr. at 39). 
For two years after she completed her undergraduate degree, Dr. Smith 
worked full time as an estimator for an industrial truss company, and then as a 
substitute teacher, earning approximately $15,000 per year. (Tr. at 27, 28, 139; Tr. 
Exhibits P-3 through P-8). 
In 1987, the parties bought a house in Tucson, Arizona, and Dr. Smith and the 
children, ages 10 and 9 at the time, moved to Tucson, Arizona in July of that year for 
her entry into medical school at the University of Arizona in Tucson, . (Tr. at 29, 30). 
Mr. Ence continued to work in Phoenix, sometimes going to Tucson on weekends 
while Dr. Smith attended medical school full-time and continued as the children's 
primary care giver. (Tr. at 30). Mr. Ence's work consisted of running a crane and 
driving a pick-up truck 50,000 miles a year which took him out of the Phoenix area on 
occasion. (Tr. at 30, 140). If Mr. Ence had a job to do while in Tucson or nearby, he 
came home on weekdays. (Tr. at 30, 142). The company Mr. Ence worked for had a 
branch in Tucson, and the parties discussed his move to Tucson. (Tr. at 82). 
Since Mr. Ence was not living in Tucson and not available to help with the 
children, Dr. Smith assumed full responsibility for their care. During Dr. Smith's first 
two years of medical school, she was able to be home with the children when they 
were home. (Tr. at 80, 81). However, during her third and fourth years, she was 
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required to spend more hours at the hospital resulting in her hiring a first year 
medical student to live in the home and to take care of the children in exchange for 
the student's room and board. (Tr. at 82). 
Dr. Smith borrowed approximately $49,000 to finance her medical school 
education. (Tr. at 30, 32; Tr. Exhibits P9 through 11). Her tuition for medical school 
was $21,734 and, with books and miscellaneous expenses, the total cost was 
$23,000. (Id.). The remaining $26,000 went to meet household expenses. (Tr. at 
32). 
Dr. Smith has paid back a part of the money she borrowed for medical school 
and is still paying it back by working at her current post residency employment with 
the Medical Arts Clinic in Brigham City. (Tr. at 32 through 38; Tr. Exhibit P12). A part 
of Dr. Smith's tuition, amounting to $1,252.50, was paid off through savings acquired 
during her residency and the first few months of employment at the Medical Arts 
Clinic while Mr. Ence was not working. (Tr. at 39; Tr. Exhibit P11). 
While Dr. Smith was in medical school, Mr. Ence continued in construction 
work earning approximately $45,000 in 1987, $41,000 in 1988, and $36,000 in 1989 
and 1990. (Tr. at 164, 165; Tr. Exhibits P4 through P7). In 1989, Mr. Ence's hourly 
wages were reduced from $18.52 per hour to $14.50 per hour when another company 
bought out the company he worked for. (Tr. at 145). 
Dr. Smith graduated from medical school in May 1991 and moved to Ogden, 
Utah, in June, 1991, to fulfill her internship and residency requirements at McKay Dee 
Hospital. (Tr. at 40). She did her internship and residency from June 1991 through 
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June 1994. In the late summer or fall of 1991, Mr. Ence worked for approximately five 
weeks, then did not work again until approximately three and one-half years later, 
which was after the parties had separated and Dr. Smith had filed for divorce. (Tr. at 
41, 42, 170). 
From July 1991 to July 1994, Dr. Smith's income from her residency program 
and from extra jobs totally supported the family. Total family income in 1991 was 
$30,242.00 with $15,385 earned by Dr. Smith as a resident and her extra work at 
blood drives. (Tr. Exhibit P8). Mr. Ence quit his job in Phoenix a month before the 
family moved to Utah in order to help with the move; he was earning $15.00 per hour 
at the time. (Tr. at 147). Dr. Smith earned approximately $34,000 in 1992 while Mr. 
Ence received $4,455 from unemployment. (Tr. Exhibit P13). Her moonlighting was 
in addition to her regular hours of up to one hundred (100) hours a week. (Tr, at 46) 
In 1993, Dr. Smith earned a total of $60,035. Approximately Thirty Thousand 
($30,000) was earnings from her regular residency work and the rest came from 
moonlighting at clinics in North Ogden and Fairfield, and blood drives. (Tr. at 46, 47; 
Tr. Exhibit P14). 
In her thrrd year of residency, Dr. Smith also worked in Malad, Idaho, in the 
emergency room of a hospital one weekend per month which entailed a sixty (60) 
hour weekend. This work was in addition to her regular Monday through Friday work 
in Ogden. (Tr. at 47, 151). 
In 1994, Dr„ Smith earned a total of $106,381. (Tr. at 48; Tr. Exhibit P15). She 
earned $65,700 from her employment at McKay Dee Hospital and the Medical Arts 
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Center and earned $40,000 moonlighting in Malad, Idaho. At the end of June 1994, 
she completed her residency and took a month off to take her board exam, and a 
vacation, and then started working August 1, 1994, at the Medical Arts Clinic in 
Brigham City, working a forty (40) hour week. (Tr. at 48, 49). 
The parties separated in December, 1994. At the time of trial, September 1995, 
Dr. Smith was earning $120,000 a year. (Tr. at 76). Dr. Smith has a written 
employment contract with the clinic in Brigham City which expires in August 1997. 
(Tr. at 75; Tr. Exhibit P12). Under her employment contract, the hospital pays all of 
her overhead, money for continuing education and her medical malpractice 
insurance; this will terminate when her contract ends and she may choose to look for 
work elsewhere. (Tr. at 77). 
The benefits Dr. Smith receives are the result of the hospital's recruiting 
practices where they seek to entice medical doctors to Brigham City, which is 
considered a rural area. (Tr. at 78). If she had stayed in Ogden, Dr. Smith would 
have received $90,000 per year but would not receive loan repayment provisions in 
the contract. (Tr. at 78). 
At the time of trial, Mr. Ence was earning $12.00 per hour, operating heavy 
equipment in St. George, Utah since March, 1995. (Tr. at 170, 173). He tried to get 
his old job back paying $15.00 per hour in Arizona, but it was not available and he 
could not find other work in Arizona, (id). 
Throughout the marriage and up to the time the parties separated in December 
1994, the parties' lifestyle was modest. When the parties first married, they lived in a 
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small mobile home and moved to a small two bedroom, 1,100 square foot house 
when the children were young, which house they later sold for $32,000. (Tr. at 86). 
The parties lived in mobile homes thereafter until they bought the Tucson home. (Tr. 
at 87). Just prior to living in the Tucson home, the parties lived in a single 14 x 70 
mobile home in Phoenix. (Tr. at 29, 140). When Dr. Smith moved to Tucson, the 
parties bought a three bedroom , 1,500 square foot home on an acre of land, paying 
$92,000 for it. (Tr. at 86, 87). Mr. Ence stayed in Phoenix and lived in a 19' camping 
trailer on his parent's land paying them a little to help with the electric bill and eating 
meals with them at times. (Tr. at 116, 141, 166). When the parties moved to Ogden, 
they rented a house for $745 per month. (Tr. at 87). Except for a trip to Alaska in 
1994, the parties' vacations were usually spent visiting relatives. (Tr. at 49, 88). They 
purchased moderately priced cars and did not buy expensive clothes. (Tr. at 88, 89). 
In September 1994, the older child, Ty, entered his first year at Utah State, 
living in a private dorm room and the cost for his education was between Five and Six 
Thousand ($5,000 and $6,000) dollars the first year he attended which was paid for 
by Dr. Smith. (Tr. at 90). Ty had finished high school in three years with straight A's. 
(Tr. at 91). At the time of trial, Dr. Smith was also paying for the youngest child's 
education who is attending Weber State University and living at home. (Tr. at 90, 91). 
From the time Mr Ence quit working in 1991 and continuing to the time of trial, Dr. 
Smith was the sole support of the children. (Tr, at 95). 
At trial, Dr. Smith submitted an exhibit showing her current expenses of $4,104 
per month and anticipated monthly expenses of approximately $5,454 per month. 
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(Tr. at 102-105; Tr. Exhibit P17). Mr. Ence did not dispute her monthly expenses nor 
her anticipated monthly expenses. Mr. Ence submitted no testimony or exhibits 
showing his monthly expenses or his need for any particular amount of money. (Tr. 
at 171, 172). 
The trial court rendered its decision and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law set forth in the Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony of $1,700 per month 
for 21 years. 
A. The trial court failed to analyze the alimony award using the three Jones 
factors which must be considered in every award of alimony. Mr. Ence produced no 
evidence at trial showing his financial condition or his need for alimony and the court 
failed to analyze the award based on his need. As to his earning capacity or ability to 
produce income, the court found Mr. Ence has a present net income of $1,600 per 
month, $25,000 per year, but made no findings concerning his earning capacity. As 
to the third factor, the court apparently recognized that Dr. Smith has the ability to 
pay alimony but, made no findings based upon her financial needs or her financial 
situation. 
B. The trial court failed to make detailed and specific Findings of Fact to 
support the alimony award. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991) and 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(7)(e) allows the court the discretion to make a 
compensation adjustment in dividing the marital property and in awarding alimony 
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when there is, at the end of the marriage, drastic income changes due to the 
collective efforts of both spouses. The court must give these situations some weight 
in fashioning an award, but it has discretion in determining the appropriate 
adjustment and no particular result is mandated. However, the court cannot give an 
award which reflects a property interest in the other spouse's earning potential or 
advanced degree. Martinez, 818 P.2d at 542. 
The history of alimony decisions in Utah shows that the supporting, i.e., non-
professional spouse is to be considered for a Martinez-type award only in situations 
where the supporting spouse becomes economically disadvantaged in a virtually 
absolute sense in that she was unable to earn a living either at all or above minimum 
wage. The supporting spouse must be either in need of support for rehabilitation 
purposes, or have enjoyed the increased standard of living for a significant period of 
time. These circumstances were not found by the trial court in this case. 
Because the facts in the present case are not applicable to the situations 
requiring Martinez-type compensation, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to enter the challenged alimony award. The court, for the most part, ignored the 
factors as required in Jones and decide to "reward" Mr. Ence with a large alimony 
award which is inconsistent with the Martinez decision and the cases preceding it 
The trial court abused its discretion as there is no evidence that Mr. Ence made 
career or education sacrifices, or that he reduced his standard of living to enable Dr. 
Smith to obtain her degree. There is no evidence that Mr. Ence did anything other 
than what he did all along, providing support as he was legally obligated to do. 
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C. The trial court erred in finding that Mr. Ence contributed significantly and 
substantially to his wife's attendance at medical school. It found that Dr. Smith was 
not the only one to put herself through medical school and that both parties 
contributed significantly and substantially to her attendance at medical school as well 
as the common family good. The court, however, did not specify any particular 
contributions Mr. Ence made to Dr. Smith's education which would explain its award 
of alimony even though it specified Dr. Smith's contributions. The trial court's findings 
regarding Mr. Ence's contributions are in error because there is insufficient evidence 
to support them. 
The evidence reveals that it was Dr. Smith that put herself through medical 
school by her own hard work, by borrowing and repaying the money herself, while 
taking full responsibility for the children and home with little or no help or sacrifices 
from Mr. Ence. The evidence shows that the major change in Dr. Smith's income was 
not due to the collective efforts of both spouses at all but rather due almost 
exclusively and certainly primarily to the individual efforts of Dr. Smith above and 
beyond her historical functioning as a homemaker. 
While Dr. Smith acknowledges that Mr. Ence willingly provided support to the 
family throughout the marriage, Dr. Smith contends the court failed to reconcile the 
legal duty of support each spouse owes to the other and how this alone can be a 
called a significant contribution to Dr. Smith's education. The evidence shows that 
Mr. Ence did nothing additional while Dr. Smith was in medical school or an 
undergraduate than he did all during the parties' marriage. Case law requires an 
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exceptional effort on Mr. Ence's part, but the trial court did not so find. Thus, the trial 
court's alimony award was an abuse of its discretion. 
II. Martinez and § 30-3-5(7)(e) contains no guidelines to limit the trial court's 
discretion and, therefore, this court must establish guidelines. 
The Jones criteria served to limit the trial court's exercise of discretion by 
assessing the financial concern of the parties. Unfortunately, neither Martinez nor § 
30-3-5(7) (e) directs the trial court to do anything other than "consider" the collective 
efforts of the spouses in setting alimony. Dr. Smith argues that this court must limit 
the trial court's discretion by confining the Martinez type discretion to circumstances 
involving unjust enrichment and/or reimbursement alimony. In the present case, the 
trial court did not set forth its reasons as to why it arrived at an alimony award of 
$1,700 per month for twenty-one (21) years other than to reward Mr. Ence with "a 
reasonable standard of living" which he had never enjoyed. It made no Findings of 
Fact on what that "reasonable standard of living" was, or upon what it would be 
based. It did not address specifically the Martinez criteria. Normally, this would 
require a remand, but Dr. Smith argues that since the record is clear and 
uncontroverted, this court can remedy the trial court's abuse of discretion. 
Other jurisdictions, as in Utah, refuse to treat marriage as strictly a financial 
undertaking requiring strict accounting and reimbursement for various contributions. 
Other courts look to whether the professional spouse has been unjustly enriched and, 
if so, the award is limited to the financial contributions and living expenses and direct 
educational expenses. If this court awards reimbursement alimony, it should look to 
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the direct expenditures and make actual compensation based on those expenditures 
but, compensation should not be merely for the sake of providing the legal obligation 
of support every spouse owes to the other. It should be based on real sacrifices and 
contributions from the supporting spouse, not merely on the fact that the supporting 
spouse allowed or simply didn't object to the other spouse obtaining an education 
while making no exceptional sacrifices or contribution towards that effort. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ALIMONY OF $1,700 PER MONTH FOR TWENTY-ONE YEARS 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to Mr. Ence for three 
reasons: First, the court failed to analyze the alimony award using either the factors 
required by Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), or by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 30-3-5(7)(a). Second, the court's Findings of Fact are not 
sufficiently detailed so as to disclose the steps by which the court determined the 
amount and duration of the alimony award which is clearly excessive in this case. 
Third, the court found that Mr. Ence contributed significantly and substantially to Dr. 
Smith's attendance at medical school but made no findings as to any particular 
contribution which would justify such an award. The award of alimony in this case is 
inherently unfair and is tantamount to giving Mr. Ence a property interest in Dr. 
Smith's medical degree and future earnings. 
A. The trial court's Findings of Fact are insufficient 
to support its alimony award 
It is well settled that the trial court must consider three factors before its 
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computation of any alimony award. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. Effective in 
July, 1995, these factors are now codified in Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5(7)(a). 
The first three factors are identical to the Jones factors and the fourth factor was 
added by the 1995 legislature. Section 30-3-5(7)(a) states as follows: The court 
should consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and need of the recipient spouse; 
(jj) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
Nowhere in the court's Memorandum Decision or its Findings of Facts is there 
any indication that the court analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of the 
required factors. This is an indication that the trial court clearly abused its discretion 
in fixing the amount and duration of the alimony award to Mr. Ence. 
1. The financial condition and need of the recipient spouse. 
In the instant case, the trial court made no findings of Mr. Ence's financial 
needs as required. At trial, Mr. Ence showed no evidence of need for alimony by 
testimony or exhibits. He produced no exhibits showing his present or projected 
monthly expenses. When questioned regarding the amount of alimony he was 
requesting, Mr. Ence's only response was that he would "be happy with $3,500" a 
month, but gave no basis showing his need for such an amount. (Tr. at 171, 172). 
The only evidence as to Mr. Ence's monthly expenses is his testimony that his rent is 
$500.00 per month (Tr. at 161), and he was ordered to pay one-half of the 
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approximately $635.00 per month house payment until the house is sold. (Tr. at 159; 
Findings of Fact # 5; R. at 97). Mr. Ence further testified that if he lived in an 
apartment he would have to come up with first and last months rent, implying he 
doesn't have the money; however, he was given and used $1,000 to go to golf 
school. (Tr. at 161, 162). 
A spouse's demonstrated need must, under Jones, constitute the maximum 
permissible alimony award. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. 
1994). In Bingham, the trial court awarded the wife $701.76 per month more than her 
projected financial requirements and the Court of Appeals reversed because the trial 
court offered no explanation for such a discrepancy. 
The trial court based its alimony award on a reasonable standard of living for 
Mr. Ence. (Findings of Fact # 13(q); R. at 102). The court failed to explain why Mr. 
Ence's own income of $25,000 per year did not provide a reasonable standard of 
living since he is supporting only himself while Dr. Smith is supporting herself and 
paying for the parties' children's college education. Mr. Ence never earned much 
more than $35,000 per year while supporting himself, Dr. Smith, and the two children. 
$25,000 per year just to spend on himself, plus the equity from the sale of the Tucson 
home, would seem to be more than adequate for him to enjoy the standard of living 
he enjoyed during the marriage. The court failed to explain why he needs an 
additional $1,700 per month for the next 21 years. Furthermore, the yearly amount of 
alimony awarded to him ($20,400), combined with his earned income ($25,000), 
exceeds the income he alone has generated during the eight years preceding trial. 
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(Exhibits P4 through P8 and P13 through P15). 
2. The recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income. 
The facts indicate that Mr. Ence is able to support himself adequately. Except 
for the three years during Dr. Smith's residency and internship, and one year when he 
was layed off, Mr. Ence has worked in construction since 1956. (Tr. at 134). In the 
past, Mr. Ence has supported the family on his income alone. He testified that his 
health is good, and he has the ability to continue to work to support himself. (Tr. at 
170). The court found that Mr. Ence currently earns a yearly income of $25,000.00. 
(Findings of Fact #13(p), R. at 102). However, in spite of the court's findings and the 
facts in evidence, the court failed to make a finding on Mr Ence's capacity to earn. 
There are no findings as to why Mr Ence is earning less at the time of trial then he 
earned previously. He only stated at trial that he was not able to get his old job back 
or any job in Arizona. (Tr. at 173). 
3, The ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Dr. 
Smith's income is currently $120,000 per year with a net of $7,000 per month. 
(Findings of Fact U 13(j),(k); R. at 101). The court apparently recognized that Dr. 
Smith has the ability to provide support. 
However, an underlying factor regarding the payor spouse's ability to provide 
support is a finding of the payor spouse's financial need and it is a necessary step in 
determining the ability to provide support. Willev v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 551 and n.1 
(Utah App. 1993). 
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In the present case, the trial court made no findings of Dr. Smith's financial 
need as required, and made no underlying factual determination required for the 
assessment of plaintiff's ability to provide support. Willev 866 P.2d at 551. Although 
Dr. Smith testified regarding her monthly expenses and her projected monthly 
expenses, the trial court did not enter findings regarding the reasonableness of the 
expenses except to omit her expenses in supporting the children. (Tr. at 225). 
Furthermore, the court failed to take into consideration the fact that Dr. Smith's 
contract expires in 1997 and what her earnings would be thereafter. She testified she 
expected to earn $80 - $90,000 per year in future years, working a 40 hour week. (Tr. 
at 101). The trial court should have made findings regarding the reasonableness of 
her anticipated lower wages once her contract with the Medical Arts Clinic expires. 
4. The length of the marriage. 
As to the fourth factor, the court noted that the marriage was of a long duration 
having lasted approximately twenty-one years. (Findings of Fact 11 13(a); R. at 100). 
However, there were no findings on why the court decided to award alimony of 
twenty-one years at $1,700 per month which equals $428,400. Dr. Smith has to work 
until she is about 63 years of age while Mr. Ence could retire almost immediately on 
the $1,700 per month alimony plus his various retirements and social security, and 
enjoy the standard of living he had all during the marriage. 
After analyzing an alimony award under Section 30-3-5(7)(a), the trial court may 
examine additional factors it deems influential in setting the amount of alimony. 
However, the above four factors must at least be considered. The trial court's failure 
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to enter these findings was error. 
B. The court erred in failing to enter specific detailed Findings of Fact 
showing how it arrived at the amount and duration of the alimony award. 
On the surface, the factual situation in the present case would appear to be the 
reverse of the common situation where the husband earns a professional degree and 
the wife works to support the family, contributes to a husband's education costs, 
provides a home, accepts a lower standard of living, a depletion of their marital 
assets, and may even forego her own education or career opportunities, all with the 
intention that their joint efforts will be rewarded by the husband's increased earning 
capacity and a better and higher standard of living when the degree is earned. Then, 
at the threshold of this increased earning power, the parties divorce. The marital 
earnings and savings were used to support the family and to meet the husband's 
educational expenses, resulting in virtually no property subject to equitable 
distribution. 
Utah courts have long recognized in these circumstances that the wife has an 
equitable claim to repayment for the investment and sacrifices she made in husband's 
education. Otherwise the husband would leave the marriage with a substantial 
increase in earning capacity obtained in substantial measures through the efforts and 
sacrifices of his wife. She, on the other hand, would leave the marriage either without 
an adequate earning capacity or with a reduced standard of living. In these cases it 
clearly is because of the wife's efforts and sacrifices that the husband was relieved of 
the burden of supporting himself and his family and was able to devote his time and 
attention to his education uninterrupted. The following is a chronological history of 
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the evolution of Utah case law on this issue. 
In Tremavne v. Tremavne, 116 Utah 483 (Utah 1949), the court appeared to 
first recognize this problem and awarded the wife slightly more than half of the value 
of the marital property in addition to a total alimony award of $475 which was payable 
in installments. The court here compensated the wife for all the years she worked 
and did not improve her ability to earn. Tremavne, 116 Utah at 486. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah court of 
Appeals explored the issue of the division of a professional license and ruled that a 
professional license is not property to be divided but acknowledged that rehabilitative 
or reimbursement alimony could be used in situations where equity demands an 
award to compensate a spouse who endures substantial financial sacrifice or defers 
their own education to help their spouse obtain an advanced degree or increased 
ability to earn. Peterson, 737 P.2d at 242, n.(4). Mrs. Peterson worked as an 
elementary school teacher to help finance her husband's education. The couple took 
out a student loan and received money from Mrs. Peterson's parents. While her 
husband was in medical school, Mrs. Peterson worked one year full time and three 
years part time. Mrs. Peterson stopped working to care for the parties' child when Dr. 
Peterson began his internship, and during the next fifteen years, she was not 
employed outside the home and her teaching certificate expired. At the time of the 
divorce, the parties had been married twenty-six years and had six children under 
eighteen years of age. The trial court awarded the wife, among other things, 
$120,000 to be paid in $1,000 monthly installments, reflecting an ownership interest in 
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the husband's medical degree. Peterson, 737 P.2d at 243. The Court of Appeals 
vacated the award and, after analyzing the criteria under Jones, directed that the 
payments of $1,000 per month, be continued as additional alimony, noting that Mrs. 
Peterson's standard of living during the marriage enabled her to enjoy a very 
comfortable lifestyle. Peterson, 737 P.2d at 242. 
This approach was followed in Ravburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 
App. 1987), where the Court of Appeals revised a $45,000 cash award into temporary 
alimony, payable at $750 per month for five years to allow the wife to obtain further 
education. Ravburn, 738 P.2d at 241. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court 
properly analyzed the wife's needs under Jones, but labeled the award as a property 
settlement to preclude termination should Mrs. Rayburn remarry. Ravburn, 738 P.2d 
at 240, n. (4). The Appellate court held that an award of non-terminable rehabilitative 
or reimbursement alimony was not appropriate in this case because Mrs. Rayburn did 
not endure substantial financial sacrifices or defer her own education to help her 
husband obtain his degree because he received his medical degree the same day he 
married. Ravburn, 738 P.2d at 241. During the five year period of Dr. Rayburn's 
internship, residency, and his military service, the parties moved, but Mrs. Rayburn 
stayed at home, for the most part, to raise their children while Dr. Rayburn was the 
primary financial provider for the family. Ravburn at 239. 
As stated in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991), usually the needs 
of the spouse are assessed in light of the standard of living during the marriage (see I 
A of this brief), and it is sometimes also appropriate to equalize the parties' standard 
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of living. In the cases that use the equalization of living standards approach, the 
recipient spouse had either become or always was severally economically 
disadvantaged as a result of having not worked either at all or substantially, outside of 
the home during the marriage. 
An early case using the equalization of living standards approach is Higley v. 
Hiqlev, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). Mrs. Higley had no present or prospective 
permanent income other than the $100 per month permanent alimony awarded by the 
trial court even though her living expenses exceeded $800 per month. The Supreme 
Court found that her efforts as a homemaker enabled her husband to build a career 
as an aircraft welder. Mrs. Higley was in poor health and had spent the last thirty 
years of her life as a full time homemaker and caretaker of five children and had no 
employment training or experiences other than with unskilled jobs. W. The trial court 
awarded her temporary alimony for 3 years in an amount equivalent to the house and 
utilities payments, but permanent alimony of only $100.00 per month. The Supreme 
Court held that an alimony award should attempt to equalize the parties' standard of 
living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. Id. Thus, the alimony award to Mrs. Higley would not 
afford her a standard of living anywhere near that which she enjoyed during the 
marriage or near that of her husband. Id. Here the court found that both parties 
made sacrifices during the marriage, since husband worked two jobs to provide for 
his family while the wife managed the home and cared for their children, thereby 
foregoing employment training, experience and benefits. Higley, 676 P.2d at 379 -
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381. The trial court's temporary alimony award was affirmed and the permanent 
alimony award was remanded. Higlev, 676 P.2d at 382. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075, the Supreme Court again recognized that 
the most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her 
from becoming a public charge. Mrs. Jones had enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle 
during the marriage and had no income producing assets and no outside income. 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court because it found Mrs. Jones 
would be unable to maintain anything even approaching the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage with the $1,000 per month alimony for five years, and 
with decreased amounts for the following years. Id, 
Another case is Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988), where 
the parties remained married long after the husband attained his medical degree with 
his wife's help. The Supreme Court, looking to the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage, held that the benefits of the wife's investment in the husband was 
adequately reflected in a greater property settlement and higher alimony award based 
upon an adequate number of years enjoying the higher standard of living during the 
marriage. During the early years, Mrs. Gardner worked full time as a secretary while 
Mr. Gardner completed his medical training. Mr. Gardner also worked various jobs 
and his parents provided support in the form of medical school tuition. At the time of 
the divorce, Mrs. Gardner had not worked for the entire thirty years of the marriage 
and Mr. Gardner was employed as a general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month. 
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Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1077. 
In Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), the trial court failed 
to consider husband's obvious ability to provide support and Mrs. Rasband's severe 
limited ability to meet her own established financial needs. In Rasband, the Court of 
Appeals recited the facts as follows: 
The parties were married in 1957, a few months after 
graduating from high school. Four children were born as 
issue of this marriage. The youngest child was 
emancipated two months after entry of the Decree; another 
is an adult and capable of self support. Mrs. Rasband 
worked occasionally at low skilled, minimum wage jobs 
and did some typing to help Mr. Rasband in his work. He 
was a manager of insurance agents from 1977 until 1984 
when he elected to work as an independent agent. 
Rasband, 752 at 1332. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's award of non-permanent 
alimony was an abuse of discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335. 
In all of these cases the common thread is that the recipient spouse, by taking 
herself out of the work force for a lengthy period during a long term marriage for 
reasons of being a homemaker and/or health reasons, became economically 
disadvantaged in an absolute sense. 
An equalization of living standards is based upon the type of facts found in 
Hiqlev, Jones, Gardner, and Rasband, which are couched in terms of severe, 
absolute economic disadvantage. None of these type of facts are found in the 
present case where Mr. Ence still has the same career he has had for almost 40 
years, where he has no health problems, and where he did not become economically 
disadvantaged as a result of any sacrifices made while Dr. Smith was attending 
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school. 
No cases in Utah employ an equalization of living standards when there is an 
end of the marriage drastic income change for one of the parties. Rather, the 
standard is now set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(7)(e). This Section 
gives the trial court the authority to make alimony and property division awards when 
there is an end of the marriage drastic income change for one of the parties. The 
standard set forth in Section 30-3-5(7)(e), now provides: 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensation adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
That language is lifted from Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 
1991), which holds: 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change, 
unless unrelated to the efforts put forward by the spouses 
during the marriage, should be given some weight in 
fashioning the support award [citation omitted]. Thus, if 
one spouse's earning has been greatly enhanced through 
the efforts of both spouse during the marriage, it may be 
appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. . .818 P.2d 538, at 542 (emphasis on language 
different from statute). 
Clearly, the minor differences in language between the Martinez holding and 
the subsequently enacted alimony statute are not significant. If the court finds that 
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there is a major change due to the collective efforts of both spouses, the court is 
mandated to give some weight in fashioning an alimony award, and also is given 
discretion in determining an appropriate adjustment of dividing marital property and 
awarding alimony. No particular result is mandated by either Martinez or our new 
statute, and the decision is completely within the court's traditional discretion. 
However, the language of Martinez, ("some weight"), hardly suggests a large alimony 
award. 
The Martinez case was a writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court, to review 
a decision of the Court of Appeals, which Court of Appeals decision had created a 
new type of property interest ("equitable restitution"), which was to be awarded to 
Mrs, Martinez in addition to a more traditional property, alimony and child support 
award. Martinez at 818 P.2d at 539 - 540. The first part of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Martinez involved the court's analysis and rejection of the concept of 
equitable restitution. (See generally, 818 P.2d at 540 - 542). 
The Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of equitable restitution as unsound 
and unmerited for three reasons: First, a marriage is not a commercial partnership 
and the efforts and sacrifices a spouse makes for the other and for their common 
marital interest cannot be quantified in monetary terms for the very idea of marriage 
contemplates mutual efforts and sacrifices. Any attempt to reduce a spouse's 
contribution to a marriage to a common denominator allowing for a comparison in 
monetary terms, would interfere with the trial court's ability to achieve an equitable 
result based on the needs of the spouses in light of the monetary resources available. 
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Martinez. 818 P.2d at 541. Second, an award of equitable restitution is extraordinarily 
speculative, giving the receiving spouse what is tantamount to a lifetime estate in the 
paying spouse's earnings that have no necessary relationship to the receiving 
spouses actual contribution to the enhanced earning power or to that spouse's need. 
Id Third, the concept of equitable restitution is indistinguishable from the concept 
that a medical degree is valued as a property interest, Id. 
The Supreme Court also rejected Mrs. Martinez' contention that the traditional 
alimony remedies and property right remedies of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, were insufficient to provide her with an equitable overall 
award in light of the facts of her case. The Supreme Court held that "those remedies 
are adequate to fashion an appropriate award that meets the standards to be applied 
in determining awards of alimony." Martinez. 818 P„2d at 542. 
The Supreme Court in Martinez addressed the unique facts of the case which 
had to do with a marriage of long duration dissolving on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of the husband spouse due to the collective efforts of both. 
Mr. Martinez attended college and then medical school during the marriage. He 
obtained financial support for his education primarily from his own earnings, student 
loans, the Gl Bill, and a bequest from his mother's estate. Mrs. Martinez did not 
contribute financially to her husband's medical education. However, the court found 
that during the fourteen year marriage Mrs. Martinez assisted extensively in Dr. 
Martinez' obtaining a college education, medical degree and internship. In addition, 
she made substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate the completion of his medical 
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schooling and internship. Mrs. Martinez also earned a very minor amount of income 
for a short period which was used for family expenses. She was in need of financial 
assistance for herself and her children and the trial court analyzed her needs under 
the factors set forth in Jones. (See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah App. 
1988)). It is noteworthy that the Utah Supreme Court did not mandate any particular 
alimony award on remand to the trial court but simply reversed the only issue before 
it on certiorari, to-wit: The equitable restitution issue, and remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings in light of their opinion and the opinion of the court of 
Appeals. Martinez, 818 P.2d at 543. 
Thus, Martinez did not mandate a particular result, and neither does the 
present statute Section 30-3-5(7)(e). Whether any adjustment should be made in 
dividing marital property and awarding alimony is up to the trial court, after resolution 
of the specific factual issues. But there must be limits on the trial court's exercise of 
discretion under § 30-3-5(7)(e) or a reviewing court cannot determine whether that 
discretion has been abused. 
The Martinez case is the only Utah case having addressed this specific fact 
situation in any detail. However, the common thread running through Tremayne, 
Peterson, Rayburn, and Martinez, is that of the court recognizing the sacrifices one 
spouse makes to enable the other one to obtain the necessary education that will 
increase that spouse's earning power. All the spouses in the above cases were 
disadvantaged economically in some way because of their efforts and sacrifice. Mrs 
Tremayne did not increase her ability to earn while helping her husband to achieve 
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his success; Mrs. Peterson worked to help her husband and cared for the children; 
Mrs. Rayburn did not work but showed need for temporary support because she had 
been away from the job market for many years. It is interesting that the court 
awarded her temporary alimony but stated that it was not appropriate to award non-
terminal rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony, because she had not made financial 
or career related sacrifices. Like Dr. Smith, in the early years of the marriage, Mrs. 
Rayburn's contribution to the family was in raising the children and maintaining the 
home while her husband provided the support. If Mrs. Rayburn had managed to 
attend school or worked during the marriage, no amount of alimony would have been 
awarded to her. The trial court in Martinez found that Mr. Martinez' increased income 
was due to some extent to the efforts of both spouses which justified the award. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d at 542. 
It is submitted that the trial court in the present case, for the most part, ignored 
the factors as required in Jones and decided to "reward" Mr. Ence with a large and a 
long duration alimony award which is inconsistent with the Martinez decision and the 
cases preceding it. The trial court failed to explain the reasons for the amount and 
duration of the alimony award and include facts in the findings which would disclose 
the steps by which it arrived at its decision. However, the court attempted to be 
equitable: 
. . . what the court has attempted to do is look at their net 
income levels and the different expenses of the parties, and 
given the history of the income in the family, make an 
allocation of alimony that appears to the court to be 
equitable taking all of those circumstances into account. 
(Tr at 224). 
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It is true that in divorce actions, the court's primary interest is one of effecting 
fairness between the parties. Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) and (3). To 
accomplish equity, the court must consider those circumstances which indicate the 
contribution by one party to the increased earning power of the other under Section 
30-3-5(7) (e). Without stating it outright, the trial court implies that it was making some 
kind of compensation award to Mr. Ence: 
I think that to characterize that situation as though the 
plaintiff was the only one that contributed to her being able 
to go through the school and to accomplish the things that 
she did is not an accurate statement. The court believes 
that both parties contributed significantly to their family life, 
such as it was during those years that the plaintiff was 
going to school. (Tr. at 222). 
During the course of the parties' marriage, they worked to 
the common good of the family unit. . . . this court could 
not characterize this situation as plaintiff having been the 
only one to put herself through medical school. Both 
parties contributed significantly and substantially to 
plaintiff's attendance at medical school. . . (Findings of 
Fact#13(e); R. at 99-100). 
The court is unable to value one parties' labor more than 
the others. . . (Findings of Fact #13(g); R. at 100). 
The standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their 
marriage does not approach the standard of living which 
can be enjoyed by the plaintiff now, based upon her 
income. On the other hand, during the time the parties 
lived together as husband and wife, the defendant 
contributed in part to achieving plaintiff's current financial 
situation . . . (Findings of Fact #13(n); R. at 102). 
However, in Martinez, the Supreme Court states that "the very idea of marriage 
contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice. Yet, in this case, Mrs. Martinez 
would value only her contribution to the marriage and not his." 818 P.2d at 541 In 
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its award of alimony, the trial court seems to value only Mr. Ence's contribution to the 
marriage and not Dr. Smith's. 
Furthermore, underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, is its 
concern that marriage is not a business enterprise which requires strict economic 
accounting for all financial aid rendered during its course. Along with equitable 
restitution, the Supreme Court in Martinez rejected any idea of entitlement to financial 
reimbursement for efforts made in assisting a spouse to obtain an advanced degree. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d at 540. The court also rejected any idea that a spouse could 
benefit for life by sharing in the other spouse's increased earning capacity. Id. 
The present case can hardly be compared with these past Utah cases. Nor is 
it the reverse of the common situation described above when courts attempt to 
remedy an injustice done to a spouse who makes substantial financial and career 
related sacrifices. Several facts distinguished this case. First, Mr. Ence made no 
personal sacrifices which resulted in a reduced standard of living for the family 
because he did not suffer a loss of income when Dr. Smith was unemployed. He was 
the primary wage earner in the family and admitted that the jobs his wife had were 
menial. (Tr. at 138). Second, even though Mr. Ence provided support to Dr. Smith, 
he provided no financial capital for tuition, books and other expenses. Dr. Smith paid 
or is paying back, out of her own earnings, all of her medical school and 
undergraduate expenses. (Tr. at 32 through 39; Tr. Exhibit P12). Also, there is no 
indication that he deferred his own career or education to advance hers and, while 
Mr. Ence provided for the family's financial support during most of the marriage, Dr. 
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Smith, in turn, raised the children, performed the household responsibilities, and even 
managed to provide complete support to the family for three and one-half years after 
she attended medical school and while she finished residency. Furthermore, unlike 
the typical situations when the couple struggle with a reduced standard of living 
allowing no accumulation of assets, the family's modest income during the marriage 
enabled them to accumulate modest assets. They purchased a home and personal 
property, such as cars and household furnishings and continued to accumulate 
savings in Mr. Ence's retirement plans, valued at over $60,000. (Tr. at 65 through 72; 
Tr. Exhibits P20 and P21). Finally, Mr. Ence left the marriage being able to support 
himself reasonably at the standard of living he enjoyed during the marriage from his 
own earnings. 
Thus, Dr. Smith's medical degree was not obtained at Mr. Ence's expense. Mr. 
Ence did not become economically disadvantaged in any absolute sense. Rather, 
Mr. Ence contributed to the support of the family while Dr. Smith was unable to work 
because she was attending medical school. It was the same support contributions he 
made willingly when Dr. Smith was not able to work because she stayed home and 
took care of the children and home. Mr. Ence should be no more entitled to 
reimbursement for supporting his wife than she is entitled to seek reimbursement for 
the years she worked and supported him while he voluntarily chose not to work. In a 
situation such as this, it is inherently unfair to compensate one spouse to the 
exclusion of all other contributing persons to the achievement of the other spouse. 
Even if Mr. Ence had struggled with support, his contributions to her degree only 
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plays one part in the overall achievement. There is no question that Dr. Smith as well 
as the children have made sacrifices towards her achieving her medical education 
and increased income. 
If an important criterion for fashioning the alimony award under the statute is 
fairness, it was not fair to award Mr. Ence alimony in the amount of $1,700 per month 
for twenty-one years because Mr. Ence provided Dr. Smith support for the four years 
during medical school and four years during undergraduate school. The Martinez 
court specifically rejected any entitlement to such financial reimbursement. It also 
rejected any idea of a spouse benefiting for life by sharing in a former spouse's 
increased earning capacity. But that is what the trial court did in awarding Mr. Ence 
nearing a half a million dollars for nearly the rest of his life. Even if this court 
determines that somehow Mr. Ence should be rewarded for this support, it should 
find that the alimony award is so excessive as to be inherently unfair to Dr. Smith, and 
an abuse of discretion. 
C. There is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Ence 
contributed significantly and substantially to his wife's attendance at medical school. 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they are 
against the clear weight of evidence or that they induced a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
For a successful attack on the trial court's Findings of Fact, an Appellant must 
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate 
that, even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
35 
insufficient to support the findings. Scharaf v. M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 
1985). 
The trial court's findings regarding Mr. Ence's contributions to Dr. Smith's 
education is without adequate .evidentiary support. Even though Mr. Ence testified as 
to his efforts to help, the court was mistaken in its findings that Dr. Smith was not the 
only one to put herself through medical school and that both parties contributed 
significantly and substantially to her attendance at medical school as well as to the 
common family good. (Findings of Fact #13(e), (h); R. at 100). In its ruling on 
September 28, 1995, the court considered the specific contributions Dr. Smith made 
to her medical education: 
Plaintiff, and to her credit, during this marriage not only 
worked as a homemaker and from time to time worked 
part-time jobs, but also in the somewhat traditional sense 
put herself through school in that she was the one that 
went to school and did the studying and obtained the 
grades necessary to advance herself. And was able to 
obtain eventually an admission to a medical school, and 
then. . . a medical degree, and is now working as a 
medical doctor. The plaintiff, in order to finance that 
schooling, took out student loans. And has been paying 
these loans off. And part of her employment package that 
attracted her to Brigham City involved monies that were to 
be used to pay off those student loans. (Tr. at 221-222). 
. . . she was working as a homemaker, keeping the house 
on keel, taking care of the children, and putting herself 
through school, which to the court appears to be a 
phenomenal effort on her part. (Tr. at 225). 
The court, however, did not specify particular contributions Mr. Ence made to 
Dr. Smith's education which would explain its award of alimony or why it found his 
contributions to be significant and substantial, contributing "in part" to where Dr Smith 
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is today. (Tr. at 224). Mr. Ence testified that since the children were born in 1976 
and 1977, and through the period of time Dr. Smith earned both her undergraduate 
and medical degrees, he was the main financial support of the family. (Tr. at 138, 
139, 144). Even though Mr. Ence testified that it was no picnic in Phoenix driving a 
pick-up truck 50,000 miles a year and running a crane up to fourteen hours a day, the 
evidence is insufficient to show significant and substantial contributions. (Tr. at 140). 
The evidence, contrary to the findings, reveals that it was Dr. Smith who put 
herself through medical school by her own hard work, by borrowing and repaying the 
money herself, while taking full responsibility for the children and home with little or 
no help or sacrifices from Mr. Ence other than the usual financial support. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the major change in Dr. Smith's income was 
not due to the collective efforts of both spouses at all, but rather due almost 
exclusively and certainly primarily to the individual ambition of Dr. Smith. 
Dr. Smith was alone with the children when she attended medical school. 
Even Mr. Ence admits it was an uphill climb for her in Tucson with the house and 
kids, and going to school. (Tr. at 140). After being accepted to medical school, Dr. 
Smith testified she wanted Mr. Ence to live with them in Tucson to help out, but he 
liked his job in Phoenix and wanted to stay there even through the company he 
worked for had a branch in Tucson. (Tr. at 82, 83). Mr. Ence does not deny this but 
contends, however, that he wanted to be with his family, that he applied for jobs in 
the Tucson area and none were available, and it was necessary to stay with the job in 
Phoenix, even when he received a cut in pay, because it was the best way he could 
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support the family. (Tr. at 145, 146). However, Mr. Ence admits that he did not have 
a lot of time to look for a job in Tucson because he was working forty to sixty hours 
per week while in Phoenix, and driving 50,000 miles a year with his truck. (Tr. at 
167). But Dr. Smith testified it became fairly obvious to her that he didn't want to 
move to Tucson and had no intention of moving there because working the Phoenix 
job was easier than working in Tucson. (Tr. at 82, 83). If he had transferred to 
Tucson, Dr. Smith would not have needed to hire a first year medical student to help 
with the children. (Tr. at 82). But the court mistakenly characterized Mr. Ence's 
support as actually enabling Dr. Smith to have a housekeeper/nanny in exchange for 
housing. (Findings of Fact #13(f); R. at 100). 
Mr. Ence implies that living in the 19' camp trailer on his parents property away 
from his family was a personal sacrifice. (Tr. at 141-146, 166). However, the court 
made no findings indicating that living in the camper trailer was a substantial 
contribution and the testimony is in dispute whether it was even necessary for him to 
remain in Phoenix. The evidence shows that while Dr. Smith was in medical school, 
Mr. Ence continued to work to support the family as he did throughout the marriage, 
but did nothing extra in the way of helping her through by making financial or career 
related sacrifices. 
Dr. Smith's testimony is undisputed that throughout the children's youth and up 
to the time the parties moved to Ogden, Utah in June 1991, she assumed full 
responsibility for the care of the children, the home, the household chores, the yard 
and cooking with little help from Mr. Ence in these areas. (Tr. at 22-25; 78 through 
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83). She even worked part-time jobs. (Tr. at 21, 22). Later, she attended college 
and retained the full responsibility for the children and home while managing to work 
one semester. (Tr. at 22). Meanwhile, Mr. Ence continued to work and support the 
family as he had been doing all along and nothing changed for him. Dr. Smith also 
arranged for and assumed full responsibility for her student loans and received 
scholarships to pay for the balance of her education. (Tr. at 25; Tr. Exhibits P1 and 
P2). The parties did not have to deplete their financial assets in order for Dr. Smith to 
attend school. Instead, they were able to save enough money to buy a house in 
Tucson, paying approximately $10,000 for a down payment. (Tr. at 140). There is no 
evidence that Mr. Ence made any sacrifice during this period. His standard of living 
remained the same as he was the main financial support of the family. 
When they moved to Utah and Mr. Ence quit working, Dr. Smith testified she 
was forced to work longer hours while continuing to do her share of the housework, 
approximately fifty (50%) percent. (Tr. at 84). Dr. Smith testified that the parties 
agreed and intended that during her residency, Mr. Ence would continue to work as 
she expected to earn only about $29,000 per year. (Tr. at 40, 41). Mr. Ence 
contends he was not able to find a job as a crane operator in the Ogden, Salt Lake 
and Brigham City area. (Tr. at 148, 149). However, Mr. Ence did find work 
immediately after the move to Utah and worked for approximately one week, then told 
Dr. Smith he had quit working, would not look for another job and was going to stay 
home with the kids. (Tr. at 41, 42). Mr. Ence contends that he quit working because 
he was afraid his employer would not pay him and that Dr. Smith agreed that he 
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would not work and, instead, stay home to care for the children and do the 
household chores. (Tr. at 151). But, according to Dr. Smith, the children did not 
need a fulltime parent in the home during the day as they had caused no problems in 
the past and, being teenagers, they were self-sufficient and could care for themselves. 
(Tr. at 42, 43, 85). Furthermore, the parties lived within a couple of blocks of Ogden 
High where the children attended school. (Tr. at 43). Dr. Smith testified that the 
parties selected this location so the children could be self-sufficient in getting to and 
from school and they were able to fix their own breakfast, and do their own laundry. 
(Tr. at 84 through 86). However, Mr. Ence contends that by staying at home, he was 
there for the children if they needed him and he could do the household work. (Tr. at 
151, 152). Dr. Smith was concerned, however, about Mr. Ence not working because 
there would not be enough money to live on. (Tr. at 43). Instead, Mr. Ence told her 
he was entitled to be supported by her because he had put her through medical 
school. (Tr. at 44). There is no question Mr. Ence felt entitled to support for he 
testified at trial that he was entitled to alimony because he backed his wife when she 
decided to pursue her education with any support and effort that he could do. (Tr. at 
160). 
Because Mr. Ence did not work, Dr. Smith found it necessary to find extra jobs 
to support the family, sometimes working up to one hundred hours per week. (Tr. at 
46). Dr. Smith testified that working the amount of hours she did was not required for 
the residency program nor, was it considered best for her to work that much. (Tr. at 
47). She testified that she worked the large number of hours because she had to 
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meet expenses with two children who would soon be going to college. (Tr. at 48, 
91). During 1993, Dr. Smith testified she was asking Mr. Ence to work on a monthly 
basis but he refused saying that it was not necessary, that she was making plenty of 
money. (Tr. at 48, 86, 92). Even Mr. Ence admits that his wife worked hard and the 
hours were long. (Tr. at 151). But he testified his wife complained about his not 
working only six months before the parties separated, and urged him to do something 
with his life, even to volunteer. (Tr. at 153). 
There is no dispute that Mr. Ence provided support to his family throughout the 
marriage up until 1991 when he quit working altogether. However, there is no 
evidence that he made unusual or exceptional sacrifices to support his wife's efforts 
to obtain her medical education and that he was worse off at the time of trial because 
of them. Mr Ence testified he worked long hours in construction, supporting the 
family while Dr. Smith went to medical school. (Tr. at 143, 144). But he chose to 
stay in Phoenix with the job he preferred, even when his hourly rate was cut, rather 
than join her in Tucson; he chose to be unemployed in Ogden, Utah, rather than 
working a different job. 
Contrary to the court's findings, there is little evidence of substantial efforts or 
sacrifices on the part of Mr. Ence in helping his wife to obtain a medical degree. Mr. 
Ence testified that he was embarrassed at times by being called "Mr. Mom1' and 
people sometimes gave him strange looks and snickered. (Tr. at 154). He also 
testified he told his wife he would support her wherever she wanted to go and it had 
been like that since she started medical school. (Tr. at 155). He also testified that he 
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supported his wife in every way he could and that they both had dreams and plans 
and Dr. Smith told him there would be a day when he wouldn't have to work as hard 
as he was. (Tr. at 158). Mr. Ence's testimony is not disputed. However, this is not 
the standard for awarding alimony. There is no evidence that Mr. Ence sacrificed his 
own job skills, earning potential, or jeopardized his position as a heavy equipment 
operator in any way while Dr. Smith was in school, or by the move he made to Utah. 
Mr. Ence worked in construction all his life, not only during the time his wife was 
attending school. 
The court's Findings were induced by an erroneous view of the law. Although 
the court found that all of Mr. Ence's paychecks went "into the family pot, . . . which 
helped with keeping a roof over the family's head, and keeping food on the table." 
(Tr. at 222), it failed to reconcile the legal duty of support each spouse owes to the 
other with how this alone can be called a significant contribution to Dr. Smith's 
education. Furthermore, all of Dr. Smith's paychecks also went into the family pot, 
when she worked, including parts of her student loans. 
More importantly, the trial court did not specify whether it considered Mr. 
Ence's paychecks to be more significant and substantial contributions when Dr. Smith 
was pursuing her education than when she was at home raising the children, 
sometimes working part-time but not attending school. Considering Mr. Ence's 
support during the years Dr. Smith attended school to be any different from his 
support when she stayed home with the children or worked part-time would be to 
ignore what the parties agreed to during their marriage. The decision that Dr. Smith 
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would be unemployed was one born of the marriage. So was the decision that she 
attend school. When Mr. Ence quit work to stay home, there may not have been full 
agreement, but it was a decision made during the marriage. That the marriage 
proved unsuccessful should not permit entitlement to an alimony reward for the sake 
of the reward itself. It should not permit a court to consider contributions of support 
when a spouse is unemployed and attends school to be any different then when the 
spouse is unemployed and assumes full responsibility for the home and children. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-(3) states that". . . every man shall 
support his wife when she is in need." Clearly the intent of Section 30-3-5(7)(e) is not 
to reward or compensate a husband or wife for supporting their spouse during the 
ordinary course of the marriage. It is only when one spouse endures substantia! 
financial sacrifices or defers his own education or career to help the other spouse 
obtain hers that the alimony adjustment contemplated in Martinez, supra, and § 30-3-
5(7)(e) should be utilized. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to bring these 
unique provisions into play. Because the court's findings are without adequate 
evidentiary support and also induced by an erroneous view of the law, this court 
should reverse and order that no alimony be awarded. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD USE FACTORS OR 
GUIDELINES WHEN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO 
MAKE A COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENT IN DIVIDING THE 
MARITAL PROPERTY AND AWARDING ALIMONY 
Our new statute and case law provides no guidelines on how to make 
compensation adjustments in alimony awards in cases such as the present one when 
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compensation is an issue. Neither does it provide any supporting factors for the trial 
court to consider in arriving at a fair amount of alimony or property distribution. While 
the court must address the four criteria of § 30-3-5(7)(a), no criteria are specified for 
making additional or different awards under § 30-3-5(7)(e). Because of this, the 
decisions of other jurisdictions may offer guidance. 
A large number of other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of 
compensation to a spouse when the parties divorce soon after the student spouse 
receives his or her degree or license. In some of these cases, the couple had 
accumulated substantial marital assets over a period of time from which assets the 
working or supporting spouse received large awards of property, maintenance, and 
child support. A number of jurisdictions have also addressed cases such as the 
present one where there is little or no marital property from which to order any award 
to the working spouse and that spouse has demonstrated an ability to support, not 
only herself or himself, but the family as well. Compensation has involved a number 
of different theories. 
A case with the similar factual background as the present one is St.-Pierre v. 
St.-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984). Here the court refused to award alimony to 
the husband because he could support himself. The parties were married, had two 
children, and shortly thereafter the wife was accepted into medical school. The 
husband had obtained employment with the University of South Dakota School of 
Education and he later worked at the Division of Allied Health and then the Indian 
Studies Program. Furthermore, he wrote a book on Indian art and earned his Master 
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of Arts degree during the time that plaintiff was earning her medical degree. After 
medical school, the wife received a waiver of her tuition in return for her agreement 
that she would practice medicine in South Dakota. The parties started building a 
home while plaintiff began practicing medicine in Eagle Butte as a part of her three 
year commitment to pay off her student loans. At that time, husband was 
unemployed, as he was working on building the parties' house and couldn't find 
work. St.-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d at 253. 
When the parties divorced, the husband made a claim for alimony saying he 
gave up his career in order to move so that his wife could attend medical school and 
that he made substantial contributions to plaintiff's attainment of a medical degree 
and her increase in future earning capacity. He felt that he should be compensated 
for his contributions by being awarded the family home or, in the alternative, being 
awarded alimony in such an amount and for such period oftime as necessary to 
enable him to attain competency to earn at a level equivalent to that which he would 
have had had he not sacrificed his career to support plaintiff in her career pursuits. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota did not agree. Because an educational 
degree is not property to be divided or valued, the court looked to an alternative 
method by which the husband might be compensated for his contributions to his 
wife's professional training and her enhanced earning capacity pulling therefrom, the 
court concluded that: 
In a proper case the trial court should award alimony as 
reimbursement to the supporting spouse for his or her 
contribution to the non-working spouse's obtaining of an 
advanced training or in the way of rehabilitative alimony to 
45 
enable the supporting spouse to refresh or enhance the job 
skills that he or she needs to earn a living. We do not 
propose that the trial court be bound by any specific 
formula or approach in determining the amount of such 
alimony. Just as the trial court is not bound by any 
mathematical formula in dividing marital property, neither 
should the trial court be bound by a rigid inflexible formula 
in awarding reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony. 
Rather, the trial court should consider all relevant factors 
including the amount of the supporting spouse's 
contributions, his or her foregoing opportunities to enhance 
or improve professional or vocational skills, and the 
duration of the marriage following completion of the non-
supporting spouse's professional education. St.-Pierre, 357 
N.W.2d at 262. 
In St.-Pierre the Court found that: 
The husband did not forego any career plans or 
advancement as a result of moving with his wife to attend 
medical school and that he did secure employment which 
is hardly the type of personal sacrifice and self deprivation 
that is characteristic of so many cases in which one's 
spouse contributes to the professional education of his or 
her partner, [d. 
Like the court in St.-Pierre, the Utah Supreme Court has also rejected the 
concept that the contributions of spouses during the marriage be compared in 
monetary terms because an alimony award based on such concept would be 
tantamount to giving a lifetime estate in the paying spouse's earnings but have no 
necessary relationship to the receiving spouse's actual contributions to the enhanced 
earning power or to that spouse's needs. Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 
(Minn. 1981), affirmed an award of restitution to the wife for the financial support she 
provided her husband while he attended medical school. The award, however, is 
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limited to the money expended by the wife for husband's living expenses and any 
contributions made toward his direct educational costs. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d at 
759. In this case, the wife had demonstrated an ability to support herself but the 
court found that the sacrifice she made in foregoing the immediate enjoyment of 
earned income to enable her spouse to pursue an advanced education on a full time 
basis, with the expectation that the parties will enjoy a higher standard of living in the 
future, justified such an award. In the present case, there is no evidence that Mr. 
Ence sacrificed any amount of income to enable Dr. Smith to attend school nor did 
he pay any educational expenses. 
Also, in Mahonev v. Mahonev, 453 A.2d 527 (NJ 1982), the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey ordered "reimbursement alimony,1' finding that the supporting spouse 
should be compensated for all financial contributions toward her former spouse's 
education including household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses 
and other contributions used by the student spouse in obtaining his or her degree or 
license. Mahonev 453 A.2d at 534. However, not every spouse who contributes 
toward the other spouse's education or professional training is entitled to 
reimbursement alimony. For instance, it is unlikely that a financially successful 
executive's spouse who, after many years of homemaking, returns to school would 
upon divorce be required to reimburse her husband for his contributions toward her 
degree. Furthermore, reimbursement alimony should not subvert the basic goals of 
traditional alimony and equitable distribution. Mahonev 453 A.2d at 535. The court in 
Mahonev explained the award by acknowledging that a supporting spouse has 
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contributed more than mere earnings to her student husband, undergoing personal 
financial sacrifices, resulting in a reduced or lowered standard of living during the 
period her husband has not been employed. This loss of support and reduction of 
the standard of living, coupled with the unfairness resulting from the loss of the 
supporting spouse's expectation of future advantages, is what justifies reimbursement 
alimony. There is no such loss in the present case. Mr. Ence's standard of living 
during the marriage was never reduced. Until 1991, when he stopped working, he 
never depended on Dr. Smith for support or income. He made no personal sacrifices 
in anticipation of an increased standard of living. In fact, Mr. Ence quit working 
because he thought her earnings were enough to live on. 
The Arizona Appellate Court in Pveatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. App. 
1982), refused to treat marriage as a strictly financial undertaking, fully compensating 
the parties for the investment of various contributions when they divorce. To do so 
would diminish the individual personalities of the husband and wife into economic 
entities and reduce the institution of marriage to that of a closely held corporation. 
Pveatte, 661 P.2d at 207. It is up to the trial court make specific findings as to 
whether the education, degree, or license acquired by the student spouse during the 
marriage involved an unjust enrichment of that spouse, and, if so, the award to the 
wife should be limited to the financial contribution by her for her husband's living 
expenses and direct educational expenses. Id. 
Finally, in Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1990), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that the wife who supported her husband while he obtained an education 
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was entitled to equitable reimbursement to the extent that her contributions of support 
exceeded the bare minimum of her legal obligation of support. Bold v. Bold, 574 
A.2d at 556. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah case law as well as cases from other jurisdictions, indicate that 
reimbursement or alimony to compensate one spouse for supporting the other will not 
always be appropriate or necessary. This is true in cases when the non-student 
spouse made no personal sacrifices and paid no direct education expenses. In some 
cases an award of what the Utah court's have termed "rehabilitative alimony" may be 
more appropriate. This is especially true in cases in which the contributing 
supporting spouse requires a lump sum or short term award to achieve economic self 
sufficiency or to improve or refresh his or her job skills. It should be up to the trial 
court to look at the facts and circumstances of every individual case and to determine 
what sacrifices or monetary contributions the supporting spouse has made to the 
student spouse's achievements. Any alimony award should be fair to both parties 
and the findings should indicate the facts upon which such an award is based. 
In the present case, however, the record is clear and uncontroverted that there 
is no basis for an award of alimony. The findings are insufficient and not sufficiently 
detailed to justify an award of alimony in this case. Furthermore, there is insignificant 
evidence to support the trial court's findings pertaining to the alimony award. 
Because the record is clear and uncontroverted, a remand to the trial court will serve 
no purpose and this court can weigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment. 
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This court should reverse and order that no alimony be awarded. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Ence vs. Ence, No. 945900029 9/28/95) 
THE COURT: We can now show that we are on the 
transcribed record, but will continue to tape record from 
this. Now, our record should further show that we have the 
attorneys representing the parties involved by telephone. Anc^  
on the Plaintiff's side, we have Dr. Ence, who is with Mr. 
Custen at his office. And we are on a speaker phone at his 
office. And Ms. Corporon is representing the Defendant. And, 
Ms. Corporon, as I understand it Mr. Ence is not with you. 
MS. CORPORON: That is correct, he has remained in 
St. George rather than travel to Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: All right. Now the Court finds first o^ 
all that there are grounds for the divorce as the testimony 
was given by the Plaintiff in this case. And the Court is 
going to grant a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. This divorce will become final when it is 
entered in the Clerk's Office. And the Findings and Decree 
should reflect the ruling thai: the Court presents this 
morning. And should also reflect the stipulations of the 
parties. 
The Court is going to require that the house payment that] 
needs to continue to be made on the home should be split 
fifty/fifty between the parties. 
Regarding the personal property, the parties agree that 
they would each keep the personal property in their 
1] 
52 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
possession. But during the trial there was a dispute as to 
the value of that personal property. This Court finds that 
the personal property that is in the Plaintiff possession to 
be worth $3,900.00. And that the personal property in the 
Defendant's possession is worth $2,500.00. 
The parties agreed that the Geo Metro automobile and the 
Cougar automobile would go to the Plaintiff. And that the 
pickup truck with its camper shell would go to the Defendant. 
The Court finds that the values there are pretty much a wash, 
so I havenft attempted to assign a value. Just that the 
vehicles described should each go to the parties. 
The Plaintiff should be awarded her I.R.A. of $2,000.00 
and the Defendant should be awarded the I.R.A. in his name of 
$250.00. 
The Court finds from its notes—and counsel, we didn't 
spend a lot of time on this, and you can chime in here if you 
think I am missing something. But I found from a review of m>j 
notes that there were two debts that needed to be paid that 
were the joint obligation of the parties. And they consisted 
of an A T & T credit card with a balance of $2,256.00. And 
then a Visa card with a balance of $1,600.00. The Court is 
going to order that those be paid and discharged by the 
Plaintiff. 
Do either of you want to comment on that? 
MR. CUSTEN: No, your Honor. 
2| 
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MS. CORPORON: No. 
THE COURT: Now, I realize you may want to comment 
when I get all done, and I will give you the opportunity. 
MS- CORPORON: I think those figures are accurate, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court commented on the record that J\ 
was leaning towards trying to award all of the pension and 
profit sharing assets to the Defendant in this case. And I 
asked the parties to write supplemental briefs in order to 
help me analyze the value there, and how that division might 
be made. As I went through this case in more detail in 
preparation for this decision, I have decided not to go that 
direction. And I am going to order that the pension and 
profit sharing assets be divided according to the Woodward 
formula. And that a QDRO be prepared, or QDROs,if more than 
one are necessary, to handle those proceeds. 
Now, that brings me town to an analysis of the alimony 
issue. These parties have been married in what the Court 
considers to be a long term marriage of 21 years. We have the) 
Defendant at age 56 at this time, and the Plaintiff at age 41 
Both parties have worked and contributed to the common good of| 
the family and of the marriage during their married life. 
Plaintiff, and to her credit, during this marriage not 
only worked as a homemaker, and from time to time worked part-
time jobs, but also in the somewhat traditional sense put 
3 
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herself through school in that she was the one that went to 
school and did the studying and obtained the grades necessary 
to advance herself. And was able to obtain eventually an 
admission to a medical school, and then a degree, a medical 
degree, and is now working"as a medical doctor. 
The Plaintiff, in order to finance that schooling, took 
out student loans. And has been paying those loans off. And 
part of her employment package that attracted her to Brigham 
City involved monies that were to be used to pay off those 
student loans. 
I think that to characterize that situation as though th^ 
Plaintiff was the only one that contributed to her being able 
to go through school and to accomplish the things rhat she dic^  
is not an accurate statement. The Court believes that both 
parties contributed significantly to their family life, such 
as it was during those years that the Plaintiff was going to 
school. 
The evidence would be that the parties had a home, and 
that the home was very adequate for the family. The parties' 
children and the mother lived there most of the time; with the) 
Defendant, because of his work, living away from the home, bud 
coming home on weekends. All of the Defendants paycheck went) 
into the family pot, if you will, which helped with keeping a 
roof over the family's head and keeping food on the table. 
Which also allowed during some of the school years for the 
41 
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Plaintiff to have one of the medical students live in the hom4 
and assist with the care of the children. And I believe 
generally the upkeep and care of the home. 
By saying that, this Court is not trying to put a value 
on who did more work or less work or anything else. What I aij 
finding is that the parties each contributed to the family 
good, and the accomplishments that the family made. 
I am pausing for just a moment to look at my notes. 
I find from the evidence that a view of the historical 
income of the family is somewhat interesting. The evidence 
that I have would show that there was an income of $51,000.00 
to the family in 1987; $41,000.00 in 1988; $36,000.00 in r89; 
$36,000.00 in !90; $30,000.00 in f91; $34,000.00 in '92; 
$57,000.00 I believe in '93 and $100,000.00 in '94. And then 
the evidence that was presented to the Court concerning their 
current incomes would show Plaintiff earning a gross of about 
$120,000.00 per year. And the Defendant earning gross of 
approximately $25,000.00 per year. Plaintiff having a current) 
take home—and these figures were somewhat in dispute. The 
Court finds when you factor in the amount being paid for the 
student loan, the Court believes that the net income to the 
Plaintiff is approximately $7,000.00 per month. And that the 
net income to the Defendant is approximately $1,600.00 per 
month. 
The Court believes that in this case that there has been 
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a dramatic spike increase certainly in the Plaintiff's income 
that has occurred within the last two years, with significant 
increase in the last year of the parties1 marriage. The 
income history would begin back in f87 with that contribution 
being made almost entirely by the Defendant. And then the 
Defendant began to scale back the amount of his working, and 
we reached a low in f91. And then as the Plaintiff's income 
began to increase, that reflects the increases of up to the 
present. 
The Court believes that that is important to consider in 
that the standard of living that these parties enjoyed during 
those 21 years of marriage was not anywhere near the standard 
of living that could be enjoyed by the parties at the 
Plaintiff's current level of income. On the other hand, as I 
have already stated, I believe that the Defendant, through hi^ 
contributions, contributed to the Plaintiff's in part being 
where she is today. 
The Court does not believe in this case that an 
equalization of income approach is appropriate from an 
equitable point of view. Rather what the Court has attempted 
to do is look at their net income levels and the different 
expenses of the parties, and given the history of the income 
in the family, make an allocation of alimony that appears to 
the Court to be equitable taking all of those circumstances 
into account. 
61 
57 
The Court also wants to make a record of the fact that 
certainly the Court is not downplaying in any way the effort 
that was made by the Plaintiff in this case. As I have 
already said, she was working as a homemaker, keeping the 
house on keel, taking care of the children, and putting 
herself through school, which to the Court appears to be a 
phenomenal effort on her part. 
The Court believes in this situation that an alimony 
amount of $1,700.00 per month for 21 years would be the 
appropriate award. In arriving at that, I took a look at the 
statement provided by the Plaintiff of her costs of monthly 
living, her monthly expenses. And in going down through that 
and backing out some of the items that appeared to the Court 
to be particularly needed for the children, and also 
discounting somewhat the fact that there were more people 
involved in that budget than would be involved in the 
Defendant's budget, and then taking into account what I think 
would be a reasonable standard of living for the Defendant, it) 
appeared to the Court that if I add $1,700.00 on to the 
$1,600.00 that is being taken home net by the Defendant, 
putting him at a $3,300.00 level, that that is a reasonable 
level for the Defendant to be at. 
Again, this Court is not attempting to equalize the 
income because the Plaintiff will have certainly more net 
income than the Defendant. But the Court again believes that 
7| 
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a major portion of that increase is just this spike that has 
occurred right at the end of the marriage, and is not 
something that is part of the standard of living that these 
parties have grown accustomed to. 
Now with regard to attorney fees, the Court believes thatj 
the rate of $150.00 per hour that was proffered by Ms. 
Corporon based on her 15 years of experience and the Court's 
observation of her work in the courtroom, that that rate is 
reasonable. And I believe, Ms. Corporon, you indicated that 
your attorney fees bill was at $3,000.00? 
MS. CORPORON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court believes after I have done 
some adjustments, after the alimony award, that it would be 
appropriate for the Plaintiff to pay $1,000.00 towards 
Defendant's attorney fees. And that Plaintiff should be 
responsible for her own attorney fees. 
Now, have I left you with some loose ends? 
MR. CUSTEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Custen. 
MR. CUSTEN: QDRO, what figures—can you hear me? 
MS. CORPORON: What do you mean what figures? 
MR. CUSTEN: We argued different values—I am sorry, 
different time frames on the defined contribution. I think it| 
should— 
THE COURT: Mr. Custen. 
59 
MR. CUSTEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you to go off the speaker 
phone for a moment. And then if you want to put me back on a^ 
I discuss any further ruling, you can. But you are breaking 
up. And I am having trouble hearing you. 
MR. CUSTEN: Got me? 
THE COURT: Now I can hear you better. 
MR. CUSTEN: I donft have the memoranda in front of 
me. It seems to me, Mary and I were disputing the value on 
the defined contribution plan as to whether it should stop— 
whether we should value it all the way through. It seems to 
me like the figure was about 60 percent, though, either way. 
MS. C0RP0R0N: The QDRO will fix that problem. 
THE COURT: Ms. Corporon, do you want to make a 
comment? 
MS. CORPORON: Just that I think what Marty is 
saying is that with the defined contribution plan, there is nd 
plan administrator to do the math for us to figure out what iq 
attributable to what period of time. Therefore we still need 
to know what percentage of that plan goes to Plaintiff and 
what percentage goes to Defendant. We address that in the 
memorandum. 
Now my argument in the memorandum was essentially that h^ 
contributed many years—he contributed many years before the 
date of the marriage to the plan itself. And that there is 
9| 
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some monies thatfs attributable to interest earned on 
premarital contributions that she didn't do anything to 
enhance. It just was sitting there and would have continued 
to grow without any marital contribution. That was the basis 
for our argument as to how the plan should be divided. And I 
think Marty argued in his memorandum it should be split 
fifty/fifty. So I would leave it to the Court on that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Custen. 
MR. CUSTEN: Well, yeah, I was talking to my client 
I am trying to remember. It seems to me I did it two ways. 
There was a fact sheet that was attached that Mary probably 
saw that we didn't put into evidence that discussed the 
credits that Mr. Ence got on his defined contribution plan. 
Do you know the one I am talking about, Mary? It came from 
the guy, Hafner, whatever his name was. Although the plan 
started in 1960 for instance, your Honor, Mr. Ence didn't 
start accumulating these credits until about '65. 
But when I did a rough percentage, when I did like 
either—you know, when I put that as a 35 year period with 21 
years being during the marriage versus a shorter period using 
the number of years, the number of credits that were accrued 
during the marriage and those accrued before, oddly enough it 
came out to about 60 percent either way. So I think when Maryj 
looks at that, we can probably work that out. 
MS. CORPORON: What you are saying is 60 percent of 
10 
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the plan is marital? 
MR. CUSTEN: 60 percent of the defined contribution 
plan—(inaudible). 
MS. CORPORON: Right. 
MR. CUSTEN: I will do whatever number of QRDOs it 
takes and so forth. 
MS. CORPORON: So we are talking about his getting 
40 percent of the defined off the top, and then the 60 
percent? 
MR. CUSTEN: Yeah, however they do it. My guess is 
being a defined contribution plan, they will segregate it ovex| 
to an account in Wendy's name. 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable with that, Ms. 
Corporon? 
MS. CORPORON: I think so. 
THE COURT: That will be the Court's ruling then. 
And so do you need any more detail from me than a 60/40 split 
on the defined contribution plan? 
MR. CUSTEN: No, we will work that out, Judge. 
I don't know if you put this in, but Dr. Ence would like 
to be restored to her prior surname of Smith. 
THE COURT: I did have that in my notes. That will 
be the Order of the Court. 
MS. CORPORON: Marty, who is going to prepare the 
documents on this? 
Ill 
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MR. CUSTEN; I am g o i n g t o l e t y o u , Mary , b e c a u s e I 
am g o i n g o u t o f t o w n . 
MS. CORPORON: Okay . I n e e d t o know w h a t Dr . 
S m i t h f s f i r s t , l a s t and m i d d l e name w o u l d b e . 
MR. CUSTEN: W e n d a l y n , W e n d a l y n , Gay, G a y , 
S m i t h . 
THE COURT: Now, c o u n s e l o r s , c a n you b o t h h e a r me? 
MS. CORPORON: Y e s . 
THE COURT: Is there anything else that you need of 
me while we are on the record by way of questions about the 
ruling or anything I have left out? 
MS. CORPORON: I have no other questions that come 
to mind right now. 
MR. CUSTEN; No, I think Mary and I can add it in 
and agree on it. 
THE COURT: All right. Then what I will do, I don't} 
mind you continuing your conversation but we will go off the 
record at this time. And I will keep you here on the phone a^ 
long as you need to be talking to each other. 
MS. CORPORON: I think that's it. 
MR. CUSTEN: I think that's it. Mary, I will be 
gone to the 10th, so give me—that's assuming you crank it outj 
right away. 
MS. CORPORON: I will just give it to you around the) 
10th of October. 
12( 
63 
MARY C. CORPORON #73 5 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suire 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
WENDALYN ENCE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LARRY D. ENCE, 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come before the court for 
trial Friday, the 8th of September, the Honorable Michael J. 
Glassman, District Courr. Judge presiding, the plaintiff appearing 
in person and by and through her counsel of record, Martin W. 
Custen, the defendant appearing in person and by and through his 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, the court proceeded to hear 
testimony of the parties and their counsel, and to review the file 
and the pleadings contained therein, and more than ninety-days 
having elapsed since filing the complaint for divorce, the court 
having heretofore made and entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; based thereon and for good cause appearing; 
MCPOfUA ROLL 1S<S PAGE 1 3 2 , 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE ^ ^ ^ tfft 
Case No. 954900029 
Judge Michael J. Glasmann 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Both parties are granted a decree of divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the 
same to become final and effective immediately upon being signed by 
the Judge and entered by the Clerk. 
2. No child support or maintenance is awarded for the minor 
child. Plaintiff is awarded custody of the minor child, subject to 
defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. 
3. The parties shall continue to list the real property in 
Tucson, Arizona for sale with a duly qualified real estate agenr 
pursuant to a multiple listing contract, and that they use their 
best efforts to accomplish the sale of this property as soon as is 
commercially feasible at a commercially reasonable sales price. 
Upon the sale of the property, the sale proceeds, net of payment of 
the outstanding mortgage obligation for the property, and net of 
payment of the costs of sale, including a reasonable real estate 
sales commission, shall be divided equally between the parties, 
one-half to each. Until such time as the home in Arizona has sold, 
the parties shall share equally in the payment of the monthly 
mortgage obligation for the home, and each shall hold the other 
harmless on one-half of that monthly payment. 
4. Each party is awarded the items of household furnishings 
and fixtures, appliances, personal clothing and effects, currently 
in his or her possession free and clear of any claim of the other 
party. 
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5. The Geo Metro and the Cougar vehicles are awarded to the 
plaintiff free and clear of any interest of the defendant. The 
pickup truck and camper are awarded to the defendant free and clear 
of any interest of the plaintiff. Each party is ordered to pay and 
assume any debt or obligation which encumbers the title of the 
motor vehicle awarded to him or to her, and each shall hold the 
other harmless thereon. 
6. The building lot acquired by the parties is awarded to the 
plaintiff free and clear of any interest of the defendant as the 
plaintiff's sole and separate property, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon which she shall pay and assume and to hold defendant 
harmless thereon. 
7. Each party is awarded his or her individual retirement 
account free and clear of any claim of the other. 
8. The debts to AT&T and Visa shall be paid by the plaintiff 
and she is ordered to hold defendant harmless thereon. Each party 
is ordered to pay and assume any debts or obligations incurred in 
his or her own name commencing effective with the date of filing of 
the cgmplaint for divorce herein and each shall hold the other 
harmless thereon. 
9. Defendant's retirement plan through his union shall be 
divided equally between the parties, one-half to each, according to 
the Woodward formula. A stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order shall issue from this Court, as necessary, to accomplish this 
distribution of the retirement plan. 
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10. Defendant's defined contribution retirement plan through 
his union shall be divided 40% to the defendant free and clear of 
any interest of the plaintiff, as the defendant's sole and separate 
premarital and non-marital property, and the remaining 60% shall be 
divided between the parties, one-half to each. Hence, 70% of the 
plan is awarded to the defendant, and 30% to the plaintiff. A 
stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue from this 
Court as necessary to accomplish this distribution of the defined 
contribution retirement plan. 
11. Defendant is awarded alimony from the plaintiff in the 
sum of $1,700.00 per month, said alimony to commence effective with 
the month of October 1995, and to continue for 21 years from the 
date of signing and entry of the decree of divorce herein, or until 
the death of the plaintiff, the death of the defendant, or the 
defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever event should 
occur first. 
12. Plaintiff is ordered to pay a portion of defendant's 
attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00, and defendant shall pay 
the remaining balance of his attorney's fees. The plaintiff shall 
pay her own court costs and attorney's fees in this matter, and she 
shall hold defendant harmless thereon. 
13. Each party shall execute and deliver all necessary 
documents to transfer the title and ownership of the properties of 
the parties as discussed herein. 
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14. Plaintiff's surname is restored to her and she shall be 
known from the date of signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce 
herein as "Wendalyn Gay Smith." 
DATED this /^ day of A/^^JJI^^/JL , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL L . GL£S1?4ANN 
D i s t r i c t C o u i x J u d g e 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
_- to . 
MARTIN CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing 
Decree of Divorce, to be mailed, postage prepaid, by placing a true 
and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
on the U day of flt\ rfjdoO^ , 1995. 
Secretary 
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MARY C. CORPORON #735 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
WENDALYN ENCE, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, flQN ^ Klfc 
-vs- Case No. 954900029 
LARRY D. ENCE, Judge Michael J. Glasmann 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come before the court for 
trial Friday, the 8th of September, the Honorable Michael J. 
Glassman, District Court Judge presiding, the plaintiff appearing 
in person and by and through her counsel of record, Martin W. 
Custen, the defendant appearing in person and by and through his 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, the court proceeded to hear 
testimony of the parties and their counsel, and to review the file 
and the pleadings contained therein, and more than ninety-days 
having elapsed since filing the complaint for divorce, based 
thereon and for good cause appearing; the court now makes and 
enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were residents of Weber County, State of Utah, 
for three months or more immediately prior to the filing of this 
action. 
2. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties, making the continuation of rhe marriage impossible, 
3. The parties maintained their marital domicile in Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
4. There have been two children born as issue of this 
marriage, both of whom had achieved their majority or were abour to 
achieve their majority as of the date of trial herein. For this 
reason it is reasonable, just and proper that no disposition be 
made for support or maintenance of the minor children. Plaintiff 
should be awarded custody of the minor child, subject to 
defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. 
5. During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties 
acquired an interest in certain real property located in Tucson, 
Arizona, consisting of a single family home and residence. As of 
the date of trial herein, this residence was not: occupied by either 
party, and was listed for sale. It is reasonable, just and proper 
that the parties be ordered to continue to list this property for 
sale with a duly qualified real estate agent pursuant to a multiple 
listing contract, and that they use their best efforts to 
accomplish the sale of this property as soon as is commercially 
feasible at a commercially reasonable sales price. Upon the sale 
of the property, the sale proceeds, net of payment of the 
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outstanding mortgage obligation for the property, and net of 
payment: of the costs of sale, including a reasonable real estate 
sales commission, should be divided equally between the parties, 
one-half to each. Until such time as the home in Arizona has sold, 
the parties should share equally in the payment of the monthly 
mortgage obligation for the home, and each should be ordered to 
hold the other harmless on one-half of that monthly payment. 
6. The parties have previously made a fair and equitable 
division of their household furnishings and fixtures, appliances, 
personal clothing and effects, and each party should be awarded the 
items currently in his or her possession free and clear of any 
claim of the other party. The court finds that the personal 
property awarded to the plaintiff has a value of $3,900.00 and the 
personal property awarded to the defendant has a value of 
$2,500.00. 
7. During the course of their marriage, the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain motor vehicles including a Geo 
Metro, a Cougar, and a pickup truck and camper. The Geo Metro and 
the Cougar should be awarded to the plaintiff free and clear of any 
interest of the defendant. The pickup truck and camper should be 
awarded to the defendant free and clear of any interest of the 
plaintiff. Each party should be ordered to pay and assume any debt 
or obligation which encumbers the title of the motor vehicle 
awarded to him or to her, and each should be ordered to hold the 
other harmless thereon. The court finds that this distribution of 
3 
72 
the motor vehicles has the effect of equalizing the value of the 
vehicles as between the parties. 
8. During the course of the parties' marriage, the plaintiff 
has acquired an interest in a building lot located in the Stare of 
Utah. This building lot should be awarded to the plaintiff free 
and clear of any interest of the defendant as the plaintiff's sole 
and separate property, subject to the indebtedness thereon which 
she should be ordered to pay and assume and to hold defendant 
harmless thereon. 
9. During the course of the parties' marriage they have 
acquired an interest in certain individual retirement accounts. 
The plaintiff's individual retirement account has a value of 
approximately $2,000.00. The defendant's individual retirement 
account has a value of approximately $250.00. Each party should be 
awarded his or her individual retirement account free and clear of 
any claim of the other. 
10. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
Incurred certain debts and obligations including an AT&T card and 
a Visa. The indebtedness owing for the AT&T card is approximately 
$2,256.00. The indebtedness owing for the Visa card is 
approximately $1,600.00. These marital debts and obligations 
should be paid by the plaintiff and she should be ordered to hold 
defendant harmless thereon. Each party should be ordered to pay 
and assume any debts or obligations incurred in his or her own name 
commencing effective with the date of filing of the complaint for 
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divorce herein and each should be ordered to hold the other 
harmless thereon. 
11. During the course of their marriage the defendant has 
acquired an interest in a defined benefit retirement plan through 
his union. This retirement plan should be divided equally between 
the parties, one-half to each, according to the Woodward formula. 
A stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order should issue from 
this Court, as necessary, to accomplish this distribution of the 
retirement plan. 
12. During the course of the parties' marriage and prior to 
the time of the parties' marriage, the defendant acquired an 
interest in a defined contribution retirement plan through his 
union. Forty percent of this defined contribution plan should be 
awarded to the defendant free and clear of any interest of the 
plaintiff, as the defendant's sole and separate premarital and non-
marital property. The remaining 60% of the existing defined 
contribution retirement plan should be divided equally between the 
parties, one-half to each. Hence, 70% of the current value of the 
plan should be awarded to the defendant and 30% to the plaintiff. 
A stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order should issue from 
this Court as necessary to accomplish this distribution of the 
defined contribution retirement plan. 
13. The defendant husband has made a claim for alimony from 
the plaintiff wife. With regard to this claim for alimony, the 
court makes the following factual findings: 
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a* The parties' marriage is of long duration, having 
lasted approximately 21 years; and 
b- The parties' have jointly raised two children to 
maturity during this marriage; and 
c. Plaintiff is 41 years of age; and 
d. Defendant is 56 years of age; and 
e. During the course of the parties' marriage, they both 
worked to the common good of their family unit. Defendant was 
employed full-time outside the home until the plaintiff completed 
medical school, working as a heavy equipment operator. The 
plaintiff was first a homemaker, then worked outside the home, and 
then attended medical school during the course of the parties' 
marriage. Plaintiff took student loans to finance her medical 
school education, which are now being paid in full by reason of her 
current employment. However, this court cannot characterize this 
situation as plaintiff having been the only one to put herself 
through medical school. Both parties contributed significantly and 
substantially to plaintiff's attendance at medical school; and 
f. The lifestyle of the parties during their marriage 
was such that they had an adequate home. All of defendant's 
paychecks went to the "family pot." During the time plaintiff 
attended medical school, this house supported by the defendant's 
labors enabled the plaintiff to have another medical student live 
with her as a housekeeper/nanny, in exchange for housing; and 
6
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g. The court is unable to value one party's labor more 
than the other's; and 
h. Each party contributed significantly and 
substantially to the common family good; and 
i. The combined historical annual income of the family 
is approximately as follows: 1987, $51,000; 1958, $41,000; 1989, 
$36,000; 1990, $36,000; 1991, $30,000; 1992, $34,000; 1993, 
$57,000; and 1994, $100,000; and 
j. Plaintiff's gross income is currently $120,000,00 per 
year and defendant's current gross income is $25,000.00 per year; 
and 
k. Plaintiff's income, net of taxes is $7,000.00 per 
month and defendant's income, net of taxes is $1,600.00 per month; 
and 
1. The parties have realized a dramatic increase in 
their combined household income in the past two years; and 
m. In 1987, the defendant was virtually the sole 
contributor to the parties' household income. In 1995 that 
situation has been reversed, and the plaintiff is virtually the 
sole contributor to the parties' household income; and 
n. The standard of living enjoyed by the parties during 
their marriage does not approach the standard of living which can 
be enjoyed by the plaintiff now, based upon her income. On the 
other hand, during the time the parties lived together as husband 
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and wife, the defendant contributed in part to achieving the 
plaintiff's current financial situation; and 
o. Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, it 
would not be equitable to equalize the income of the parties; and 
p. Defendant should be awarded alimony from the 
plaintiff in the sum of $1,700.00 per month, said alimony to 
commence effective with the month of October 1995, and to continue 
for 21 years from rhe date of signing and entry of tne decree of 
divorce herein, or until the death of the plaintiff, the death of 
the defendant, or the defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, 
whichever event should occur first; and 
q. The alimony award in this case is based upon a 
reasonable standard of living for the defendant. 
14, The court finds that the award of alimony in this case 
does not equalize the parties' incomes, and that the plaintiff will 
still have significantly more net income than the defendant. 
15. The court finds that the defendant's attorney, Mary C. 
Corporon, has charged a fee in this matter of $150.00 per hour, 
which the court finds to be a reasonable fee for an attorney of her 
experience practicing in this community in the field of contested 
domestic relations law. The court finds that it is reasonable, 
just and proper that the plaintiff should pay a portion of 
defendant's attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00, and that the 
defendant should pay the remaining balance of his attorney's fees. 
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The plaintiff should pay her own court costs and attorney's fees in 
this matter, and she should hold defendant harmless thereon, 
16. Each party should execute and deliver all necessary 
documents to transfer the title and ownership of the properties of 
the parties as discussed herein. 
17. Prior to her marriage to the defendant, the plaintiff was 
known by the surname "Smith" and this surname should be restored to 
her and she should be known from the date of signing and entry of 
the Decree of Divorce herein as "Wendalyn Gay Smith." 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, "Che court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties of this 
action and the subject matter of this action. 
2. That a decree of divorce should be awarded to defendant on 
the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final 
immediately upon being signed by the court and entered by the 
clerk. 
3 . That said decree of divorce should be in conformance with 
the foregoing findings of fact. 
DATED this day of /i/*iiAG^M^-<s- , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL L^LASMANN 
D i s t r i c ^ C o u r t Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
MARTIN CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plainriff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 8 4401 
on the % day of / 5 Vt2lJ,Piy , 1995. 
Secretary 
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